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Abstract—Resilience is an essential property for critical net-
worked environments such as utility networks (e.g. gas, water and
electricity grids), industrial control systems, and communication
networks. Due to the complexity of such networked environments
achieving resilience is multi-dimensional since it involves a range
of factors such as redundancy and connectivity of different system
components as well as availability, security, dependability and fault
tolerance. Hence, it is of importance to address resilience within
a unified framework that considers such factors and further en-
ables the practical composition of resilience mechanisms. In this
paper we firstly introduce the concepts and principles of Multi-
Level Resilience (MLR) and then demonstrate its applicability in
a particular cloud-based scenario.
Index Terms—Resilience, cloud security, multi-level resilience
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years resilience has received considerable attention
by industry, governmental bodies as well as research. This
is motivated by the need for resilient mechanisms that can
manage and control complex, mission-critical networked en-
vironments (e.g. industrial control systems, utility networks)
and further guarantee their continued operations. A number of
recent incidents have shown that the interruption of normal
operations of critical systems can lead to major disruptions
within society and business, i.e. the socio-economic backbone
in today’s society.
In the past resilience has been mainly achieved through
structural means (e.g. through redundancy and distribu-
tion) [1], which has proven a viable strategy, (e.g. during the
2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan the fixed line
telephone networks and fibre based data networks were by
enlarge still operational due to sufficient redundancy being
in place 1). However, providing resilience solely through
structural means is in itself no longer sufficient since specif-
ically cyber challenges target service operations and system
management directly. An example is one of the largest ever
reported DDoS attack against a French Web site in February
2014 reaching 400Gb/s [2]. More profane reasons for a service
disruption can be something simple such as a misconfiguration,
which was the suspected cause of an eight hour outage that left
618 million Chinese Internet users without a service in January
2014 [3]. Thus, resilience has to be an active property that is
1http://www.electronicsnews.com.au/news/japan-s-2011-earthquake-and-
tsunami-communications, March 2011
supported through appropriate mechanisms (such as anomaly
detection and remediation) as well as a structural characteristic
achieved through passive, architectural means.
The provisioning of resilience also needs to consider dif-
ferent system layers of interconnected systems. Research ac-
tivities such as [5] [6] have developed evaluation metrics for
the resilience of communication infrastructures. These help to
analyse and subsequently improve structural resilience. How-
ever, approaches that aim to coordinate operational resilience
via joint detection and remediation processes has received
less attention. Anomalous events (malicious or legitimate, e.g.
in the case of DDoS and Flash Crowds) can propagate and
affect a number of subsystems within a given networked
environment. Further, in some cases the attribution of an
anomaly needs additional information from another system
level (e.g. a sys log) to fully establish the root cause. Hence,
it is critical to design solutions that combine the various
information levels on both the network and system stack in
both a vertical (i.e. on a given subsystem) and horizontal
fashion (i.e. across multiple subsystems) in order to detect and
identify the cause and source of an anomaly, and the location
where remediation actions should be triggered.
Despite the fact that in some areas resilience indicators from
different levels are jointly considered a systematic approach
towards the area of multilevel resilience is so far lacking.
In this paper, we structure the approach-to-design space by
introducing a multi-level resilience (MLR) taxonomy and by
outlining principles and concepts. Furthermore, this paper
briefly discusses different aspects related to structural and
operational MLR. Subsequently we use an example based on
anomaly detection within the scope of cloud management to
demonstrate the applicability of the major concepts within a
specific scenario. We argue, that the work-in-progress reported
herein will establish the basis for the future design and
development of resilient mechanisms in the context of evolving
next generation network architectures.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II introduces MLR and further in section II-A provides
a clear description of the MLR concepts and principles.
Section III is dedicated at illustrating an exemplar application
of MLR on a cloud management-based scenario. Finally,
section IV summarises and concludes this paper.
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II. MULTI-LEVEL RESILIENCE (MLR)
Resilience as defined in [6] is the ability of a network (or
system) to maintain "an acceptable level of service even in the
presence of challenges". Such challenges can be of structural
and operational nature. In general four challenge categories
are being distinguished, i.e. malicious activities, operational
overload, mis-configurations, and equipment failure. Initially
the focus of this definition has been within the networking
domain but it has been shown that it is also applicable in the
systems space (e.g. clouds and data centres [8] [9]).
Early work on multi-level resilience [6] looked into the
how to provide resilience between different protocol layers of
system levels in the context of an overall resilience framework.
In keeping with the traditional layered communication view
resilience is a service property provided by a layer below to the
one above. This also applies to different communication planes
such as the data, control and management plan, as well as the
network engineering level [12]. Cross-layer principles can then
be applied to the protocol level where a protocol configuration
at a specific layer depends on the resilience provided below
this layer. However, additional information provided across the
layers about the overall system state should aid a more adapted
decision making across the layers. The concept of translucency
allows the interaction between the layers and plans in order
to optimise resilience across multiple levels.
Alongside multi-level resilience context awareness enables
the system to detect and attribute a challenge correctly within
a given environment. In doing so the resource trade-offs
(i.e. where and what kind of resilience mechanisms can be
deployed most efficiently) also have to be considered.
A. MLR Concepts & Taxonomy
In order to address multi-level resilience (MLR) more
comprehensively we propose a taxonomy that structures the
problem and solution space. In general there are two MLR as-
pects, i.e. Structural Multi-Level Resilience (SMLR) as mainly
expressed through frameworks and architectural models and
the assessment of the resilience level they offer (e.g. [12]), and
Operational Multi-Level Resilience (OMLR), i.e. providing
coordinated resilience mechanism across system layers and
even system boundaries. Within both the analysis of resilience
properties plays an important role. However, whereas for
SMLR an infrastructure is analysed regarding its ability to
withstand challenges and maintain normal operations, OMLR
provides an (online) analysis of operational resilience param-
eters in order to discover anomalies and implements remedia-
tion actions.
At a structural level resilience is achieved through means
such as replication and diversity, which can be implemented
in a complementary manner at different system levels. This
strategy allows a network or system in the event of failures to
utilise alternative resources in order to maintain the service.
At the operational level resilience is achieved through active
detection, and remediation. This happens at different points
within the systems infrastructure (ideally in a coordinated
manner). In order to capture this in a systematic manner
we propose three multi-level resilience concepts that are able
to structure and subsume these aspects. Structural Multi-
Level Resilience (SMLR) deals the analysis and provision
of resilience at an infrastructure level across a number of
infrastructure components. At the operational level there is
Analytical Multi-Level Resilience (AMLR) and Functional
Multi-Level Resilience (FMLR). Through AMLR the system
state is assessed considering the different active elements
of a connected system or infrastructure. FMLR refers to
coordinated protective action across an infrastructure in form
of detection, remediation and recovery. AMLR realises the
multi-level principles of context awareness and translucency,
whereas FMLR is mainly based on cross-layer interaction as
part of the network and system management infrastructure.
This is provided through components that observe the system
state, detect anomalous behaviour and activities and take active
actions against them. Table I summarises the different MLR
concepts.
We distinguish between two different multi-level resilience
forms, i.e. horizontal and vertical MLR. Horizontal SMLR
describes the structural analysis and coordinated deployment
of protective system elements between different, indepen-
dent (sub-)systems at the same level, e.g. an analysis of a
communication network at sub-network level. Vertical SMLR
involves a coordinated analysis and use of protective elements
across the different levels of a system or infrastructure. An
example would be the analysis of the computing infrastructure
alongside the network infrastructure within a data centre, and
the use of appropriate redundancy mechanisms. Horizontal
AMLR refers to the coordination active detection at the same
operational level, whereas horizontal FMLR would coordinate
detection and remediation mechanisms across system compo-
nents at one level. For instance, edge and core network man-
agement units can exchange information, anomaly detection
results, and coordinate the remediation actions [13]. In this
context the detection operates on homogeneous datasets (e.g.
communication traces) and also the remediation actions are of
the same kind (e.g. the selective dropping of packets belong to
a DDoS attack at the different gateway routers). Within vertical
AMLR information exchange and coordinated detection takes
place across different system levels (e.g. malware detection at
the hypervisor level of a VM based data centre and network
interfaces of the VMs). Vertical FMLR coordinates remedia-
tion actions taking place at different levels of the infrastructure
TABLE II: Analytical vs. Functional MLR
Horizontal Vertical Multi-dimensional
Analytical MLR meta-data based analysis; dependency &
cross-verification
joint feature analysis; anomaly detection
in system context
meta-data based analysis; dependency
& cross-verification; system & cross-
domain context
Functional MLR analysis based on homogeneous data; co-
ordinate remediate across multiple sys-
tems of same level
analysis based on cross-system level data;
system-level remediation, single context
analysis based on multi-source cross-
system level data; cross-level remediation
between multiple systems
(e.g. dropping packets that have been identified as malicious at
the networking level and blocking system calls from malware
related activities at the operating system level).
Essentially, horizontal forms of MLR operate on (sub-
)systems of the same type, have a more homogeneous infor-
mation and data basis, and remediation mechanisms are of
similar kind (e.g. they are either network based or OS level
remediation). In contrast, vertical MLR looks at infrastructure
components with substantially different functionality and relies
on the exchange and interpretation of information of different
types (e.g. packet and flow based network data and system
information such as CPU utilisation or number of processes).
This is also true for the subsequent remediation action, which
have to be tailored to a specific infrastructure component of a
specific system level.
If horizontal and vertical aspects of MLR are considered
together this is called multi-dimensional MLR. An example for
this is the coordinated analysis and instantiation of protective
mechanisms in distributed data centres where system and
networking properties are jointly analysed and appropriate
remediation actions are taken across the different infrastructure
components. In parallel, SMLR is always offline and FMLR
is by its nature an online operation, whereas AMLR can be
both. But if it is carried out off-line it is for forensic purposes.
Table II summarises the characteristics of both analytical and
functional MLR.
III. MLR IN PRACTICE
Cloud resilience has gained some visibility recently [14],
[15]. However, the main focus of these activities are at the
virtual machine (VM) level and the detection and protection
from misuse and threats towards hosted services. What has
gained less attention so far are anomalies affecting the cloud
management or how vulnerabilities at this level could be
exploited. In the following use case we are looking specifically
at cloud management-related anomalies and their effect as well
as the feasibility of their detection while considering different
information sources. Through this case study we demonstrate
how some of the MLR concepts manifest themselves in such
a concrete case.
A. Case Study: Cloud Management
A specific threat to cloud management is the exploitation
of specific actions the Cloud Management System (CMS)
takes in response to certain events. For instance, the CMS
will try to load balance in case of growing demand. Thus,
if a VM is resized it will eventually get migrated to another
physical machine. Essentially, this feature can be exploited
by an attacker who maliciously resizes the VM and triggers
the CMS to migrate the VMs. Unavoidably, the latter action
could potentially lead to a deterioration in the performance
and availability of cloud resources.
In the experiments carried out for this study we used a set-
up with three physical machines of which two are running a
range of cloud services (such as a mail server, Web Server, File
Server, Haddop, etc.) whereas one is running the CMS (in our
Fig. 1: Detection Methodology within a Cloud Management
Scheme
case OpenStack running on Ubuntu 12.04). During the test,
two VMs are resizing, one carries out a legitimate resizing
action (i.e. moving from 1vCPU, 2GB RAM, 40GB Disk,
386MB Swap to 2vCPU, 4GB RAM, 60GB Disk, 512MB
Swap) whereas the other one maliciously resizes (i.e. going
to 4vCPU, 10GB RAM, 120GB Disk, 1024MB Swap). Both
actions take place at the same time (i.e. minutes 1 and 6).
Our detection approach relies on the methodology illustrated
in Fig 1. Our initial empirical observations allowed us to
establish the relevant network and system features (note, the
network feature are to the separate management network, not
the general Cloud interconnection) as well as thresholds that
allow to distinguish legitimate resizing from excessive (i.e.
malicious) resizing activities. Subsequent to the initial data
pre-processing performed over the measured raw features, we
run the AD3 density detection algorithm in order to achieve
real-time anomaly detection. The background (management)
network traffic was generated through Web, FTP, Mail, and
a Hadoop HDFS Job and system data were collected at both
compute nodes (i.e. physical cloud service machines).



















Fig. 2: Simultaneous malicious VM resizing on a physical host
B. Results in the Context of MLR
Figure 2 shows the results of the AD3 analysis. The features
that have been identified as relevant for VM resizing anoma-
lies are MngtByteCount, MngtPktsCount, CPU and Memory
Commit. The identified features are on the one hand network
level features and on the other hand system level features.
According to the MLR taxonomy this is a case of vertical
analytical multi-level resilience (vAMLR) where features from
different system levels within the same system context are
taken into account. As can be seen, in both cases where
the resizing takes place there is a significant drop in the
observed normalised data density that consequently indicates
an anomaly. However, what the analysis does not allow to do
is to identify the cause, i.e. the attribution of the anomaly and
identification of the source is not possible. In order to attribute
our anomalies we consider additional information sources. In
our use case we have utilised the system log to identify the
VM and processes that have carried out a resizing activity and
subsequently to compare their actions with the original Service
Level Agreement (SLA). In order to do so we looked at the
OpenStack management logfile for specific time windows (i.e.
the time around the anomalies were detected) and identified
all re-sizing activities. The values for the memory, disk and
number of CPU of the resizing attempt are used for further
analysis. Since this is carried out at the level of the cloud
management with a view of also managing the resilience the
two detection actions together (i.e. the original AD3 analysis
of system and network features and the syslog inspection) are
and example of horizontal Functional Multi-Level Resilience
(hFMLR). What would be the next step is the suspension of
the offending VM in order to ensure that the operation of the
cloud can be maintained.
IV. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
Resilience is considered a core property of next generation
networked systems. Despite the several efforts on developing
resilience frameworks there has not been yet a generic, unified
approach that is not tied to a particular networked application
(e.g. utility networks, SmartGrid) and does not consider single-
level homogeneous data for online or offline resilience mech-
anisms. This paper outlines the concepts and current activities
undertaken in the scope of developing a unified Multi-Level
Resilience (MLR) framework that aims to agglomerate several
resilience properties and requirements. We have provide a
taxonomy of MLR and present its basic principles. In addition
the paper demonstrates the applicability of the concepts in the
context of cloud management. In the near future we aim to use
the framework in different application domains ranging from
the SmartGrid up to Industrial Control Systems to prove its
overall applicability.
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